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Abstract 
 
Under a deadweight loss of tax and transfer, there is tension between the optimal policy 
choices of a Rawlsian social planner and a utilitarian social planner. However, when with a 
weight greater than a certain critical value the individuals’ utility functions incorporate 
distaste for low relative income, a utilitarian will select exactly the same income 
distribution as a Rawlsian.  
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1. Introduction 
The Rawlsian approach to social welfare, built on the foundation of the “veil of ignorance” 
(Rawls, 1999, p. 118), measures the welfare of a society by the wellbeing of the worst-off 
individual (the maximin criterion). A utilitarian measures the welfare of a society by the 
sum of the individuals’ utilities. Starting from such different perspectives, the optimal 
income distribution chosen by a Rawlsian social planner usually differs from the optimal 
income distribution chosen by a utilitarian social planner. 
Rawls (1999, p. 182) acknowledges that utilitarianism is the single most important 
ethical theory with which he has to contend. In utilitarian ethics, the maximization of 
general welfare may require that one person’s good is sacrificed to serve the greater good 
of the group of people. Rawlsian ethics, however, would never allow this. As Rawls’ 
Difference Principle states, social and economic inequalities should be tolerated only when 
they are expected to benefit the disadvantaged. Rawls (1958) explicitly argues that his 
principles are more morally justified than the utilitarian principles because his will never 
condone institutions such as slavery, whereas this need not be the case with utilitarian 
ethics. In such a situation, a utilitarian would simply weigh all the benefits and all the 
losses, so a priori we cannot exclude a configuration in which slavery will turn out to 
confer higher aggregate welfare than non-slavery. Rawls argues that if individuals were to 
select the concept of justice by which the society is to be regulated without knowing their 
position in the society (the “veil of ignorance”1), they would choose principles that allow 
the least undesirable condition for the worst-off member over the utilitarian principles. 
This hypothetical contract is the basis of the Rawlsian society, and of the Rawlsian social 
welfare function.  
Is it possible to reconcile the Rawlsian and the utilitarian approaches? In this paper, 
we present a protocol of reconciliation by introducing into the individuals’ utility functions 
a distaste for low relative income.2 We show that when the strength of the individuals’ 
                                                 
1 “[N]o one knows his place in society, his class position or social status; nor does he know his fortune in the 
distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence and strength, and the like” (Rawls, 1999, p. 118). 
2  Evidence from econometric studies, experimental economics, social psychology, and neuroscience 
indicates that humans routinely engage in interpersonal comparisons, and that the outcome of that 
engagement impinges on their sense of wellbeing. People are discontented when their consumption, income 
or social standing fall below those of others with whom they naturally compare themselves (those who 
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distaste for low relative income is greater than a critical value, which depends on the shape 
of utility functions of the individuals and the initial distribution of incomes, then even 
under the utilitarian criterion, the maximization of social welfare aligns with the 
maximization of the utility of the worst-off individual. Intuitively, the more a society is 
concerned about “free and equal personality,” the greater is the distaste for low relative 
income. Indeed, in a contribution to the study of social welfare, Harsanyi (1955) assigns a 
prominent role to interpersonal comparisons in the social welfare function. Thus, this 
paper presents an explanation in the spirit of Harsanyi (1955) and Rawls (1974), 
reconciling the Rawlsian and the utilitarian criteria of social welfare maximization.  
Ours is not the first attempt to align Rawlsianism with utilitarianism. Arrow (1973) 
argued that if individuals are extremely risk averse, the maximization of social welfare is 
equivalent to the maximization of the utility of the worst-off individual.3 However, as we 
show below, equivalence of the two approaches can be achieved when individuals exhibit 
little risk aversion in the sense that their degree of relative risk aversion is small; 
specifically, less or equal to one. Yaari (1981) provided a proof that there exists a specific 
set of weights of the individuals’ utilities in the utilitarian social welfare function under 
which the utilitarian and the Rawlsian social optima coincide. However, our reconciliation 
protocol does not require any specific weighting of the individuals’ utilities in the social 
welfare function; specifically, the individuals are given the same weight each, equal to one, 
in the utilitarian welfare function. In comparison with Arrow (1973) and Yaari (1981), we 
obtain reconciliation under less stringent conditions with respect to the preference 
structure of the individuals and/or the construction of the social welfare function; namely, 
we align the utilitarian and the Rawlsian perspectives by taking into consideration the well 
documented concern of individuals at having low relative income. 
Nor are we the first to study the interaction between comparison utility and optimal 
taxation policy. Probably the closest to our work is a paper by Boskin and Sheshinski 
(1978) who investigate optimal tax rates for utilitarian and maximin criteria of social 
                                                                                                                                                   
constitute their “comparison group”). Examples of studies that recognize such discontent include Stark and 
Taylor (1991), Zizzo and Oswald (2001), Luttmer (2005), Fliessbach et al. (2007), Blanchflower and Oswald 
(2008), Takahashi et al. (2009), Stark and Fan (2011), Stark and Hyll (2011), Fan and Stark (2011), Stark et 
al. (2012), and Card et al. (2012). Stark (2013) presents corroborative evidence from physiology. 
3 Rawls (1974) comments that Arrow’s (1973) argument is not sufficiently compelling, intimating that “the 
aspirations of free and equal personality point directly to the maximin criterion.” 
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welfare under varying intensities of the distaste for low relative income in the individuals’ 
utility functions. They find that when a distaste for low relative income affects strongly the 
utilities of the individuals, maximization of both utilitarian and maximin measures of 
social welfare calls for highly progressive taxation - a result that reaffirms a natural 
intuition: comparison utility increases optimal redistribution. However, having admitted a 
distaste for low relative income, Boskin and Sheshinski (1978) are generally not interested 
in the convergence of the utilitarian and maximin approaches.4 Our paper takes a step 
further to show not only that redistribution becomes more intensive as the individuals’ 
distaste for low relative income is taken into account, but also that it is likely that in such a 
situation, the goals of the utilitarian social planner and the Rawlsian social planner are 
exactly congruent. 
Hammond (1977) links equality of utilities, namely equality of the individuals’ 
levels of utility, with utilitarianism. His approach is to tailor the utilitarian social welfare 
function such as to render it “equity-regarding.” In our model, however, we incorporate the 
distaste for low relative income in the utility functions of the individuals, not in the 
preference structure of the social planner as such. Namely, the preference for equity flows 
from the bottom-up rather than being “imposed” top-down. In addition, Hammond (1977) 
merely mentions that deadweight losses in the tax and transfer system may bear 
significantly on the optimality of a redistribution aimed at conferring equity on a 
population. In contrast, in our model, the deadweight loss is the reason why the Rawlsian 
and utilitarian optimal distributions can differ in the first place. 
Using an example of a two-person population, in the next section we illustrate the 
tension between the goal of a Rawlsian social planner and the goal of a “standard” 
utilitarian social planner, that is, a utilitarian social planner who is not worried about 
individuals’ distaste for low relative income. In Section 3 we conduct an analysis of the 
distributions of income chosen by, respectively, a Rawlsian social planner, a “standard” 
utilitarian social planner, and a low-relative-income-sensitive utilitarian social planner, for 
a population consisting of more than two individuals. We prove the existence of a critical 
value for the intensity of the individuals’ distaste for low relative income under which the 
                                                 
4 Frank (1985) and Ireland (2001) show that progressive taxation can be Pareto improving if people care 
about relative income. 
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optimal income distribution chosen by a Rawlsian social planner is the same as that chosen 
by a low-relative-income-sensitive utilitarian social planner. In Section 4 we present this 
critical value for the case of two individuals. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. The tension between the optimal policy choices of a Rawlsian and a utilitarian – an 
example 
The following example illustrates the tension between the two approaches. In a two-person 
population, one individual, the “rich,” has 14 units of income; the other individual, the 
“poor,” has 2 units of income. Let the preferences of an individual be given by a 
logarithmic utility function, ( ) lnu x x , where 0x   is the individual’s income. A social 
planner can revise the income distribution by transferring income between the two 
individuals - specifically from the “rich” to the “poor.” Because of a deadweight loss of tax 
and transfer, only a fraction of the taxed income ends up being transferred; suppose that 
half of the amount t taken from the “rich” ends up in the hands (or in the pocket) of the 
“poor.” Then, the post-transfer utility levels are ln(14 )t  of the “rich,” and ln(2 / 2)t  of 
the “poor.” 
How will a Rawlsian choose the optimal t? Following the maximin criterion, he 
maximizes the social welfare function 
  ( ) min ln(14 ), ln(2 / 2)RSWF t t t    
over [0,14].t  Clearly, as long as 2 / 2 14 ,t t   we will have 
 min ln(14 ), ln(2 / 2) ln(2 / 2).t t t     Therefore, a Rawlsian social planner will find it 
optimal to raise the income of the “poor” by means of a transfer from the “rich.” When 
equality of incomes is reached, the Rawlsian social planner will not take away any 
additional income from the “rich” because if he were to do so, the “rich” would become 
the worst-off member of the population, and social welfare would register a decline. Thus, 
a Rawlsian social planner will choose to equalize incomes, that is, set the optimal amount 
to be taken from the “rich” at * 8Rt  , which results in a post-transfer income of 6 of each 
individual. 
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 A utilitarian social planner, however, maximizes the social welfare function that is 
the sum of the individuals’ utilities  
 ( ) ln(14 ) ln(2 / 2)
U
SWF t t t     




2(2 / 2) 14t t
   , 
yields the optimal amount to be taken from the “rich” * 5Ut  .5 Therefore, the post-transfer 
incomes are 9 of the “rich,” and 4.5 of the “poor.” 
 From this simple example we see vividly how the objectives of the Rawlsian and 
the utilitarian social planners come into conflict. In the case of a population that consists of 
two individuals, a Rawlsian social planner equalizes incomes even if the redistribution 
process wastes considerable income due to a deadweight loss of tax and transfer. The 
objective of a utilitarian social planner does not allow him to condone such a sacrifice; to 
secure higher aggregate utility, he will tax less than the Rawlsian social planner 
( * *5 8U Rt t   ). Nor will the utilitarian social planner equalize incomes.  
 
3. Reconciling the optimal choices of the Rawlsian and the utilitarian social planners 
Consider a population of individuals 1, ,n  whose incomes are 1, , na a , respectively, 
such that 10 na a  . Our interest is in finding out the income transfer policies of a 
Rawlsian social planner, a “standard” utilitarian social planner, and a low-relative-income- 
sensitive utilitarian social planner; we refer to these three social planners as RSP, SUSP, 
and RIUSP, respectively.  
Let 0:f R R  be a twice differentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly concave 
function. Let the utility function of individual i  be  
  1 1 1 1( , , ) (1 ) ( ) ( , , , , , );i n i i i i nu x x f x RI x x x x x         , (1) 
                                                 
5 The second order condition for a maximum, ( ) 0
U




x   is the individual’s income, and RI is a measure (index) of low relative income 
of an individual earning 
i
x , specifically, 
 1
1





x x x x xRI xx   
   , (2) 
where 
j
x  for {1, , }\{ }j n i   are the incomes of the other individuals in the population.6 
The individual’s taste for absolute income is weighted by 1  , [0,1)  , his distaste for 
low relative income by  . The coefficient b  is a measure of the intensity of the 
individual’s distaste for low relative income. When an individual is not concerned at 
having low relative income, 0  .  
Let there be a social planner who can transfer income from one individual to 








      denote the possible total income that is to be taken away from individuals 
(henceforth “tax”). Due to a deadweight loss of tax and transfer, only a fraction of the 
taxed income ends up being transferred. We denote this fraction by 0 1  .7 Therefore, 
the set on which we will search the maximum of the considered social welfare functions is  
 1 1 0
1 1
( , , ) ( , , ) : max{ ,0} max{; ,0}
n n
n
n n i i i i
i i
a a x x a x x a   
           R . 
                                                 
6 The relationship between the plans or policies of a RSP and a RIUSP is not contingent, however, on the 
index of low relative income of an individual being defined as in (2). A relationship similar to the one 
demonstrated below could be shown to hold if, for example, RI were to be defined as 
2
1 11, , ,( ; ) max{ ,, , 0} .i i jn i jiR xx x x x xI x      
7 Throughout the analysis, we make an implicit assumption that the lump-sum transfer does not alter the 
individuals’ behavior (and, consequently, neither their pre-transfer income) with respect to their work/leisure 
optimization. This assumption holds if income is taken to be exogenous. However, if income includes labor 
income, and if individuals optimally choose how much time to allocate to work, then a lump sum transfer 
may change the individuals’ optimal labor supply under a distaste for low relative income. The poor 
individual may then work less when his income is increased as his marginal disutility from low relative 
income decreases when his income is raised by the transfer. A modeling of such a repercussion is presented 
in Sorger and Stark (2013). 
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The constraint defining the set   simply states that the transfer has to be equal to the 
deadweight-loss adjusted tax. Because   is a compact subset of nR , any continuous 
function defined on this set attains a maximal value.8  
In the following three subsections we delineate the optimal income distributions 
chosen by each of the three social planners. 
 
3a. The maximization problem of a Rawlsian social planner  
The maximization problem of a RSP is  






max ( , , ) max min ( , , ),..., ( , ) .,
n




SWF x x u x x u x x       (3) 
It is easy to see that for every {1, , 1}k n    we have that 
 1 1 1 1( , , , , , ) ( , , , , , )i k k n i k k nu x x x x u x x x x       
for {1, , }i n  , , 1i k k  , and that 
 1 1 1 1 1( , , , , , ) ( , , , , , )k k k n k k k nu x x x x u x x x x       . 
Therefore, without loss of generality, we may assume that 1 ... nx x  . Moreover if 
1 ... nx x  , then the monotonicity of f  and the definition of the RI function imply that 
1 1 2 1 1( , , ) ( , , ) ... ( , , )n n n nu x x u x x u x x      . 




x x  the optimal post-transfer incomes partition of a 





( , , );










x x . To prove this by contradiction, we suppose that there is 
{1, , 1}j n    such that 1* *jR Rjxx  . Then, there exists 0   which we can take from the 
                                                 
8 We note that as a sum of concave functions of the form max{ , 0} max{ , 0}
i i i i




( ) , 0, ..., max{ , 0} max{ }
n n
n i i i i
i i
x a x xg x a
 
      is also a concave function. 
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1j  -th individual and give that which remains after the deadweight loss to the j-th 
individual. The said existence is a consequence of the “Three-slope inequality” applied to 
function f, 9 and of the fact that a smaller difference between incomes implies a smaller 
value of the index of low relative income; namely, for any * *10 ( ) / (1 ),
R R
j j
x x      in 








x x x x      , we have that 
 * * *
* * * * * * * * * *
1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1
1 1
1 2 1 1 2 1
*
* * * * * * * * * *
(1 ) (
( , , , , , , ) ( , , , , , , )
, , , , , , ,
) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ; ) ( , , ,; )
R R R R
R R R R R R R R R R
R R R R R R R R R R
j j n j j n
j j j j
j j n j j n
f x f x f
u x x x x x u x x x x x
RI
x f









   
      
   
    

  0   
 







*, , ,( ) ;, , , ( , , )R R R R R
j j n n
x x x x ax a         will be higher than * *1 1( , , )R Rnu x x , 
which contradicts the fact that 
R
SWF  attains a global maximum at * *1( , , )
R R
n
xx  . Thus, the 
solution of the problem of a Rawlsian social planner, (3), is a transfer such that the post-
transfer incomes are all equal.  
Lastly, we note that the distribution chosen by a RSP entails equality of incomes 
even when 0  , namely, even if a concern of the individuals’ at having low relative 
income is excluded from the RSP’s social welfare function. 
 
3b. The maximization problem of a “standard utilitarian social planner”  








 , where 1 1, , ( , )( ) ;,n nx x a a    . Let  
1
1





SWF x x f x

  . 
                                                 
9 The “Three-slope inequality.” Suppose that :f R R  is concave and that x y z  . Then 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )f z f y f z f x f y f x
z y z x y x
      . 
A proof is in Borwein and Vanderwerff (2010), p. 19.  
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We now state and prove a claim and two corollaries that, in combination, 
characterize the distribution chosen by a SUSP, depending on the initial incomes in the 
population and on the scale of the deadweight loss of tax and transfer. 
Claim 1. Let 







  . Then 1max ( , , )U nSWF x x  is obtained for 
* *
1 1( , , ) ( , , );
U U
n n
x x a a     such that there exist 1 i j n    and 1, [ , ],na a a a  









   . Moreover, such a  and a  are unique.  








   condition in Claim 1, which relates the ratio of marginal utilities 
from income of the richest and of the poorest individuals to the extent of the deadweight 
loss, delineates the required “efficiency” of the tax-and-transfer scheme. To see the 
intuition underlying the condition, we note that due to the concavity of the f function, the 
marginal utility of the poorest individual, 1)(f a , is the highest in the population, and the 
marginal utility of the richest individual, )(
n
f a , is the lowest.10 Thus, taking a small tax t 
from the richest individual and giving t  to the poorest yields the highest possible 
marginal social gain from the tax-and-transfer, namely 1 ) )( ( ntf a f a t     . To begin 







  . 
As the SUSP proceeds to increase the tax, the ratio of the marginal utilities of the richest 
and of the poorest individuals rises, and when the ratio is equal to the level of the 
deadweight loss, the marginal gain from the tax-and-transfer procedure drops to zero. 







  , then a SUSP will not tax any income. 
Proof. The proof is in the Appendix. 
                                                 
10 Here we ignore the possibility that there are two or more richest (poorest) individuals. A more detailed 
exposition is in the proof of Claim 1. 
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Corollary 2. A SUSP will choose the RSP’s plan if and only if l = 1. 
Proof. The proof is in the Appendix. 
Claim 1 together with Corollary 1 state that, in general, the optimal distribution of 
income chosen by a SUSP will differ from the optimal income distribution chosen by a 
RSP (unequal as opposed to equal, respectively). The outcome of the optimizations of a 
RSP and a SUSP are congruent only when l = 1 (cf. Corollary 2). In the next subsection 
we show, however, that if a utilitarian social planner acknowledges that sensing low 
relative income impinges on the well-being of the individuals and that the intensity of this 
sensing is high enough, then he will choose the same income distribution as a RSP. 
 
3c. The maximization problem of a relative-income-sensitive utilitarian social planner  
The aim of a RIUSP is to maximize the function 
 1 1
1
( , , ) ( , , )
n
RU n i n
i
SWF x x u x x

    
for 1 1( , , ) ( , );,n nx x a a    . The problem of a RIUSP differs from the problem of a 
SUSP because the “behavior” (and thereby the maximum) of 
RUSWF  depends on the 
intensity of the individuals’ distaste for low relative income, as exhibited by  . Our aim 
then is to show that there exists 1   under which a RIUSP will behave just like a RSP 
(and set * *RU R
i i
x x , where *RU
i
x  is an optimal post-transfer income of individual i  in a 
RIUSP plan, for {1, , }i n  ), even if implementing a tax and transfer program involves a 
deadweight loss ( 1  ). For a given 1 na a  we will thus need to ensure that a RIUSP 
will prefer to tax and transfer incomes until the post-transfer incomes are equalized.  
Our strategy is to proceed as follows. For sufficiently large b , a RIUSP will prefer 
to tax and transfer income. Similarly as in the proof of Claim 1, we show that, indeed, if he 
needs to tax and transfer income, he will always prefer to tax the richest (if there are two 
or more individuals with the highest income, he will tax them equally) and transfer to the 
poorest (supporting equally each of the individuals with the lowest income if there are two 
or more who are the poorest). The matter to watch is that a RIUSP will not be able to attain 
 11 
the maximal value of social welfare as long as the post-transfer incomes are not equal. 
This reasoning invites looking for a b  for which the protocol of taxing the richest and 
supporting the poorest will lead to the RSP’s plan. The main outcome of this procedure is 
the following claim. 
Claim 2. For a given f  and  , there exists 1( , , ) 1na a    such that for every 
1( , , )na a   , * *RU Ri ix x  for {1, , }i n  . 
Proof. The proof is in the Appendix. 
 Claim 2 states that for the general utility function (1), the optimal income 
distributions of a RSP and a RIUSP align if the acknowledged individuals’ distaste for low 
relative income is high enough. In the next section we provide an example of the condition 
on   for the case of a population of two individuals. 
 
4. An example: a population of two individuals  
Consider a population that consists of two individuals: “1” with income 1a , and “2” with 
income 2a , such that 1 20 a a  . We are interested in finding a condition on   under 
which the income transfer policies of a RSP and a RIUSP align. To this end, we use a 
simplified notation compared to that of Section 3. Let the utility function of an individual 
with income x be  
  ( ) (1 ( )) ( ; )u x x x yf RI    , (4) 
where f  is defined as in Section 3, and  
 ( ; ) max{ ,0}RI x y y x  , (5) 
where y  is the income of the other individual. 
In the case of only two individuals, it is convenient to formulate the optimization 
problem of a social planner as the maximization of social welfare with respect to the level 
of the tax. Below, we derive a condition under which the optimal level of the tax chosen by 
a RIUSP, namely *,RUt  is the same as the tax chosen by a RSP, namely *Rt . 
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In Section 3a we showed that a RSP will equalize the incomes for any [0,1)   
and (0,1] , that is, that 
 * * 1 21 2
1




   ,  
yielding the tax  




  .  












( ) ( ) ( )
(1 ( ) ;
max max
max ) ( )








SWF t u t u ta a
a RI a a
a RI a
f t t t
f t t ta

   
  
   
 
   
     
     
 (6) 
We now state the following corollary. 















    
           
 (7) 






x x  for 1,2i  . 
Proof: The proof is in the Appendix. 
In Corollary 3 we derive a condition for the specific case of two individuals which 
is similar to that presented in Claim 2. We can now link our “reconciliation protocol” with 
two risk-related issues. First, by way of an example, we show that the alignment of the tax 
policies of the RIUSP and RSP does not hinge on the individuals being extremely risk 
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averse (the condition for reconciliation required by Arrow, 1973). To this end, let 









    
 , 







    denote the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion, where u is defined 
as in (4). Then, with ( ) lnf x x , for both cases where x y  or x y  (cf. (5)), we have 
that 1
x
r  . Thus, our “reconciliation protocol” holds in spite of the individuals’ degree of 
relative risk aversion being small (less or equal to one).  
Second, we also do not require the utility function to be of the “ruin-averse” type 




u x   . Let 
( )f x x , 0,x  0 1  . In this case, condition (7) becomes  









      

 
     , 
so, once again, 1 2( , )a a  is positive and smaller than one, and Corollary 3 holds. For this 




u x    (And here, still, 1xr  .) 
 
5. Conclusion 
We have shown that the utilitarian optimal tax policy may align with the Rawlsian optimal 
tax policy if utility depends not only on an individual’s own income, but also on others’ 
income. In other words, when a utilitarian social planner incorporates the individuals’ 
                                                 
11 Strictly speaking, a logarithmic function does not satisfy the conditions on ( )f x  assumed in Section 3 






   , excluding zero from the domain of 
the optimization problems discussed in Sections 3 and 4 does not change the presented results. 
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distaste for low relative income, he can well end up seeing eye to eye with a Rawlsian 
social planner in the choices that they make concerning the optimal tax-and-transfer policy. 
The demonstration of this congruence offers a second avenue for reconciling these two 
interpretations of the policy that would flow from the objective perspective of an 
individual behind the Rawlsian veil of ignorance, the first being Arrow’s point that 
Harsanyi’s expected utility (utilitarian) social welfare function reduces to the Rawlsian 
(maximin) social welfare function if the concavity of the individual’s utility from income 
is severe enough. We show that this congruence is attributable to a change in the stance of 
the utilitarian social planner, and is not contingent on the individuals being particularly 
risk averse. 
We provide a new reason to think that incorporating such “comparison utility” into 
optimal tax models will have large effects on the results. While more and more economists 
recognize that such comparisons are undoubtedly an aspect of reality, up until the present, 
comparison utilities have had only a minor impact on how we think about benchmarking 
optimal tax policies. This paper demonstrates that neglecting comparisons may 
substantially bias those benchmarks. 
Utilitarianism has its own well-defined ethical foundations. If a distaste for low 
relative income is to be introduced into utilitarianism, how would this be worked out in a 
consistent way? Research on this issue will enrich social welfare theory and strengthen the 
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Appendix 
Proof of Claim 1 




  , and we then 
prove that the maximum of 
U
SWF  on 1( , , ; )na a    is attained at the point * *1( , , )U Unx x , 
where * * *1 2
U U U
i
x x x a   , * *1 1, ,U Ui i j jx a x a    , and * *1U Uj nx x a   . 
 Consider a tax-and-transfer policy in which we start by taxing the richest 
individual, transferring this amount (adjusted for the deadweight loss) to the poorest. In 
case we hit a point in which the income of the poorest (richest) reaches the income of the 
second poorest (richest), we start to support (tax) them evenly, and so on. We define 
functions 
 1( ) ( )k k ka t a t t
k

    for  1,k kttt  , 
where 10 0, /
m k
k k m
t t ka a  









   for  1, llt t t , 
where 0 0, ( 1) n l
m n l
l m
t t a l a  
     for {1,..., 1}l n  . Then kt  ( lt ) is the level of tax after 
which the income of the k  most poor ( l  most rich) individuals reaches the level of income 
of the 1k  -th poorest ( 1l  -th richest). Consequently, as long as ( ) ( )lka t a t , ( )ka t  
( ( )
l
a t ) for  1, kkt t t  (  1, llt t t ) is the “income path” of the k -th poorest ( l -th richest) 
individual until he reaches the income of the 1k  -th poorest ( 1l  -th richest), after which 
he “joins” the income path of the 1k  -th poorest ( 1l  -th richest).  






( ) for , 
( )




















( ) for , 
( )













as the “income paths” of, respectively, the poorest individual and the richest individual for 
a given level of tax t.  
Because 1(0) (0)na a a a   ,12 11 1( ) ( )n n na t a a a t    , ( )a t  is continuous and 
strictly increasing, and ( )a t  is continuous and strictly decreasing, there exists 
*
0 1 1min{ , }n nt t t   such that * *0 0(( ) )a t a t . We note that for *0t t  the tax and transfer 
policy is self-contained; that is, the sum of the transfers is equal to the sum of the taxes 
(corrected for the deadweight loss).  
From the strict monotonicity and concavity of f , and the strict monotonicity and 






  is a strictly increasing and continuous 
function of t . Thus, because 
1
( )( (0))
( (0)) ( )
n
f af a
f a f a










   , there exists a 
unique 0







  . We set 





x x a    for i  individuals such that *1,..., ( )ia a a t , and * *1 ...U Uj nx x a     for j 
individuals such that 
*
1,..., ( )j na a a t  , and with * *1 1,...,U Ui i j jx a x a   . 
 We now proceed to the proof that * *1( , , )
U U
n
x x  is the maximum of 
1( , , )U nSWF x x  on 1( , , ; )na a   . Because 1( , , )U nSWF x x  is a strictly concave 
function - it is a sum of strictly concave functions ( )if x  - maximized on a closed subset 
1( , , ; )na a    characterized by a concave constraint function (cf. footnote 8 in the main 









   , we must have that 1 na a . 
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text), then, if a local maximum exists, it is also a global maximum. We show that 
* *
1 1( , , ) ( , , );
U U
n n
x x a a     defined above is a local maximum, and thus it is also a 
global maximum of 1( , , )U nSWF x x  on 1( , , ; )na a   .  
Starting from the point * *1( , , )
U U
n
x x , we consider a tax in the amount of 0t  , 
which is distributed among individuals from set {1,..., }K n , K   , by the weights 
0
k





 , and *Uk kt x  . The amount t  is then distributed 
among the remaining of individuals, namely among the set {1,..., } \ L n K , according to 
weights 0
l





 . (Proceeding in this way, we obviously do not 
violate the conditions of the set 1( , , ; )na a   ). For clarity of notation, we set 0l   for 
l L , and 0
k
   for k K . 
The change in the level of social welfare brought about by the above tax and 
transfer procedure is denoted as 
 
1






( , , ) ( , , )
( ) ( ) ( )
n n
l l k n
i
U U U U
U U n U n
U U U
k
l L k K n
SWF SWF x t t x t t SWF x x
f x t f x t f x
t      
  
  
       
 

      
We have that 





SWF f x f x              . 
Because * *1min{ , },
U U
n
ax x  , * *1max{ , },U Un ax x  , and f is concave, we have 
that *( ) ( )
i
U
f x f a   and *( ) ( )
i
U




  , 
    (0) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0U k
l L k K
l
SWF f a f a f a f a              . (A1) 
By means of the preceding tax and transfer procedure, we can characterize any 
permissible redistribution policy starting from * *1( , , )
U U
n
x x . Therefore, (A1) and the 
uniqueness of the maximum render * *1( , , )
U U
n
x x  a global maximum. Q.E.D. 
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Proof of Corollary 1 
Under the assumption of Corollary 1, for ( )
U
SWF t  defined as  
 1 11 1( , ,( ) ( , , )) n nU U n U nt a aSWF SWF t t t F aSW at               
and with 
i
  and 
i
  defined as in the proof of Claim 1, we have that (0) 0USWF   , and 
thus, upon a reasoning akin to that in the proof of Claim 1, the proof of the corollary 
follows. Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Corollary 2 







  is 
maximized for 21 ... nxx x   . On the other hand, the equal choices of a SUSP and a 
RSP entail that for a  and a  defined as in the proof of Claim 1, we will have that a a  
and thus, 1  . Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Claim 2 
First, we show that if a RIUSP has to transfer income (whether or not he should, we will 
check in the second step), then he should tax the richest individual and support the poorest 
individual. This protocol follows directly from the concavity of f  because if 1 na a , 
we have that 1( ) ( )nf a f a  . Therefore, for every 1, [ , ]nx y a a  and a small t , we 
have 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( )nf x t f y t f a t f a t        . 
Moreover, it is easy to see that the aggregate index of low relative income 
1 1 1
1
( , , , ); , ,
n
i i i n
i
RI x x x x x 
   decreases when the difference between the highest and the 
lowest incomes in the population shrinks. This implies that the best choice for a RIUSP 
(should he transfer any income) is to tax the richest individual n  and give that which 
remains after the deadweight loss to the poorest individual 1. This reasoning continues to 
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hold as long as 1n na t a   , or as long as 1 2a t a  . Therefore, for  
 
1 2 1 1 2 1
1 1
1
( ) , ..., , ..( , , ) ( , ,., )
(1 ) ( ) ( ) ( 1) (1 ) ,
n n













   
  

       
   
 
if (0) 0  , then the social planner should transfer some income. In turn, this implies the 








      , then 11
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) 1 ( 1)
n
n
f a f a
f a f a n n
  








      , then 0  . 
We need to see to it that a RIUSP will tax the richest and support the poorest as 
long as the income of the poorest is smaller than 2a , and the income of the richest is higher 
than 1na  . Because the function 
x
x
c x  (for 0c  ) is increasing on its domain, it is 
sufficient to take 11  , where 
          2 1 1 1 2 1 111 2 1 1 1 2 1 1min ( ) / , min ( ) / ,min ( ) / , min ( ) / , ( 1)(1 )n n n n nn n n n nf a a a a a f a a a a af a a a a a f a a a a a n          
                    
if 





= 0 otherwise. For such a   (which depends on 1 2 1, , , ,n na a a a   and f ), taxing 
the richest (individual n ) and supporting the poorest (individual 1) leads to one of two 
cases:  2 1 1 2 1min ( ) / , ( ) / ,n na a a a a a      or  2 1 1min ( ) / , n na a a a   1n na a   . 
We address these two cases in turn.  
When  2 1 1 2 1min ( ) / , ( ) /n na a a a a a     , then by means of tax and transfer 
we reach the point where the incomes are 2 2 3 1 2 1, ( ) /, , , , n na a a a a a a    . Let 
1 2 1( ) /t a a   . We check what happens when two individuals have the same lowest 
 23 
income. The concavity of f  implies that the best choice is to tax the richest individual 
because still 2 1( ) ( )nf a f a t    . The question is how to divide what remains after the 
deadweight loss of the taxed income. Because f  is concave, we get for every x  and for 
every [0,1]  that 
 




f a x f a x
f a x
          , 
and that the aggregate index of low relative income is also the smallest for an equal 
division of the taxed income. Therefore, the best choice is to give to the two poorest 
individuals (individual 1 and individual 2) the same amount. This means that in the next 
step, the aim of a RIUSP is to maximize 














SWF a t a t a a t t








   
            
   
 
 
for  3 2 1 10,min 2( ) / , n nt a a a a t       .13  
When  2 1 1 1min ( ) / , n n n na a a a a a      , then the incomes are 
11 2 1 1, , , ,( ) nn n na aa a aa     . Let 1 1n nt a a   . If two individuals have the same highest 
income, then the concavity of f  implies that the best choice is to tax both of them because 
still 1 1 1( ) ( )nf a t f a     . Moreover, because f  is concave, we get for every x  and for 
every [0,1]  that 
 






f a x f a x
f a x
             
and the aggregate index of low relative income is also the smallest for an equal division of 
the tax. Therefore, the best choice is to tax both the “richest” individuals (individual 1n   
and individual n ) by the same amount. This means that the aim of a RIUSP is to maximize 
                                                 
13 For  
3 2 1 1
min 2( ) / ,
n n
t a a a a t      we will have three individuals with the lowest income or two 
individuals with the highest income. 
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   
for  2 1 1 20,min ( , ( )) / 2 n nt a a a a       .14  
These considerations entail a procedure akin to that which is followed by a SUSP: 
we have 1, [ , ]na a    and 1 i j n   , such that 1 ix x   , 1 1, ,i i j jx a x a    , 
and 
n j n
x x    . Then, we express the welfare function that a RIUSP seeks to 
maximize as a function of t ,  
 
( ) (1 ) ( ) ( )




i k j i k j
t
SWF t i f t f a n j f
i n j
t t t t
n j a i n j i a
n j n j i i
  
     
 
   
                   




The right hand derivative of this function, evaluated at 0t  , is equal to  
   (0) (1 ) ( ) ( ) ( )RUSWF f f n i j             . 
Because the function 
x
x
c x  ( 0c  ) is increasing on its domain, the condition 
under which a RIUSP will continue to tax the richest and support the poorest is ij  , 
where 
          1 11 1min ( ) / , min ( ) / ,min ( ) / , min ( ) / , ( )i j i jij i j i jf a a f a af a a f a a n i j                                          
if  
     1 1min ( ) / , min ( ) / , ( )i j i jf a a a f a a n i j                     , 
and 0ij   otherwise. Also, because ( ) 0n i j    for any ,i j  such that i j n   and 
                                                 
14 For  
2 1 1 2
min ( ) / , 2( )
n n
t a a a a      we will have two individuals with the lowest income or three 
individuals with the highest income. 
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any 0 1  , we get that 1ij  . 





      (namely, for all pairs 
( , )i j  obtained in the protocol) there exist 0 0 1, [ , ]na a    and 01 i n   such that 
01 0i
x x    and 
0 0n i n
x x    . At this point, a RIUSP maximizes  
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Thus, because the choice of RSP is * 0 0[ , ]
R





(1 ) ( )





f x i n i
   
      .  
Let *1( , , ) max{ , } 1Rn max xa a     . For 1( , , )na a   we get that ** **1 2U Ux x  
** *U R
n
x x  , and the solution that a RIUSP will choose is the same as the solution that a 
RSP will choose. Q.E.D. 
 





  , individual 1 does not experience low relative income (because 
1 2a t a t   ), and we have that 
 1 2 1 2( ) (1 ( ) (1) ) (( ) )RUSWF t f a t f a t a t a t              , 
and 
  1 22 1
( ) (( ) (1 ) )1 ( ) )
(1 (
(1
) (1 0,) ( ) )
RU
f a t f a t
f a t f a
SWF t
t
     
   
     
       
   
   
because, from the concavity of f , we have that 2 1( ) ( )f a t f a t     for 
 26 
2 1a t a t   . Therefore, a RIUSP will surely not choose a transfer such that 1 will end 




   , individual 2 
does not experience low relative income, and the function maximized in (6) reduces to 
 1 212( ) ) ( )(1 ( ) ) (1 ( )RUSWF t tf a t a a t f a t             . 
We have that 
 2 1 10 2
1
(1 ) ) (1 )( ) ( (1 ) ( )a aRU tSWF t f t ta f a
             . (A2) 
In addition, because f  is concave,  
  2 1 2 21
1
0
( ) (1 () ) )( 0a aRU tSWF t f a f at t
         . (A3) 




   is the solution to the maximization 
problem (6) if the left hand derivative of the social welfare function maintains 





     , 
namely, if 





a a a a
f f
     
              
 
  . 
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Obviously, we have that 1 2( 1, )aa  . Q.E.D. 
 
